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Abstract After four years in operation the United Nations Human Rights Coun-
cil (UNHRC) is subject to criticism, and various scholars and practitioners alike
present and discuss reform proposals. In the present paper we study systematically
the controversial decisions in the UNHRC. We find that controversial proposals are
introduced by countries with a blemished human rights record, and that in the votes
on these proposals the council members belonging to the European Union (EU)
vote very distinctly from the remaining members and have preferences quite dif-
ferent from those member states that violate human rights. Extending an empirical
approach frequently used in parliamentary research we can also show that in votes in
the UNHRC preferences of member states dominate over their membership to partic-
ular blocs. As controversial votes also heavily polarize the UNHRC we argue that the
problems faced by the UNHRC’s predecessor, namely the Commission on Human
Rights, have reappeared.
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1 Introduction
From its very inception in 2006 the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC)
attracted its fair share of criticism. The assessment by former United States
Ambassador to the United Nations (UN) John Bolton was clearly the most colorful:
“We want a butterfly. We’re not going to put lipstick on a caterpillar and call it a
success”.1 After operating for four years as the successor of the even more vigor-
ously decried Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) the United Nation considers
reforming this new body of the UN.2 So far, however, no systematic studies exist
to our knowledge elucidating how the UNHRC operates during its regular sessions
(three per year).3
In the present paper we wish to contribute to filling this gap by offering a system-
atic study of the controversial votes that have taken place in the first thirteen sessions
between 2006 and 2010 in the UNHRC. While a large majority of all resolutions are
adopted without opposition or only abstentions, 70 votes between 2006 and 2010,
however, revealed clear divergences of opinion with some countries opposing the pro-
posal. In analyzing these votes we draw on the one hand on the literature on voting
in international assemblies and on the other on recent work on parliaments in gen-
eral. While the former literature has strongly emphasized bloc-voting, i.e., countries
belonging to particular groups voting together, the latter suggests that when analyz-
ing such groups (e.g., parties) one cannot neglect the role preferences play. Drawing
on an empirical approach having become prevalent in parliamentary research we can
show that the two blocs commonly assumed to be important in the UNHRC influence
less strongly voting in this assembly than variables assumed to relate with the under-
lying preferences of states. Extending this analysis we can also show that countries
with blemished human rights records are most frequently the authors of controversial
proposals. The latter often pass against the council members of the European Union
(EU), who in these votes adopt very distinct voting patterns. Analyzing more in detail
how the identity of the proposer affects voting behavior we find clear patterns that
these divisive votes play a considerable role in polarizing the UNHRC.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we briefly
present the development of human rights in the context of the United Nations as it
led to the creation of the UNHRC in 2006. Section 3 discusses the insights scholars
1
“Apologise or we’ll cut your funding, US envoy tells the UN” The Times, June 9, 2006 (see also Rajagopal
2007).
2Brett D. Schaefer “Elections for U.N. Human Rights Council Underscore the Need for Reform”
Backgrounder. No. 2417 June 2, 2010. Published by the Heritage Foundation and “Le Conseil des
Droits de l’Homme sera revu” Le Temps Septembre 6, 2010 http://emploi.letemps.ch/Facet/print/Uuid/
9018569c-b9bf-11df-9ea7-6791aedb1a60/Le Conseil des Droits de lHomme sera revu.
3Partial exceptions are the studies by Cox (2010), Seligman (2011) and McMahon (2012), focusing on
particular aspects of the new body.
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have gained by analyzing the voting behavior in other UN bodies, most notably the
General Assembly (UNGA), which provides part of the theoretical backdrop for our
study.4 Based on this literature we present three broad hypotheses on the way in
which preferences and bloc membership, in conjunction with the proposer’s identity,
should affect voting behavior. In Section 4 we present our empirical strategy which
relies on hierarchical item-response theory models that allow for a direct estimation
of the relevant parameters of interest to us. In Section 5 we present our empirical
results before concluding in Section 6.
2 Human rights and the human rights council
Following World War II human rights have become a mainstay in international rela-
tions. The devastation by the War with the numerous atrocities and the continuous
violations of international rules and norms called for a new governing body after the
failure of the League of Nations. The creation of the UN in 1945 was the first step
toward the increased importance of human rights. Soon thereafter, in 1946, the UN
created a sub-body which would deal with the promotion of human rights, namely
the Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) (for an overview, see Tolley 1987). In
1948 the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was adopted with 48 yes
and 8 abstentions in the UN General Assembly (UNGA) (Simmons 2009, 41). The
UDHR applies to all people, but on its own is not a binding legal document in interna-
tional law (Simmons 2009, 42). To ensure that the provisions set forth in the UDHR
would be applied, the UNGA worked out the two additional International Covenants
on Human Rights (1966) and the Optional Protocol, which are legally binding doc-
uments, and as a consequence can be enforced in courts (Simmons 2009, 46ff).
Nonetheless, it is the UDHR that is widely cited when it comes to human rights,
and it has become one of the foundations of our understanding of modern human
rights. On the basis of these legal documents the international community set out
countless conventions in various fields of human rights, sometimes in the framework
of international conferences and initiatives, sometimes within the UNCHR (e.g.,
Carey et al. 2010).
Regardless of the UNCHR’s success with introducing the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights of 1948, the UNCHR became over the decades a forum that was
too heavily exposed to political influence (e.g., Edwards et al. 2008). It was referred
to as the “shame of the UN”5 by outsiders as well as by insiders such as the former
Secretary General Kofi Annan. The latter stated in his special report entitled “In
Larger Freedom” that the Commission was “undermined by the politicization of its
sessions and the selectivity of its work”6 and that “the Commission’s capacity to
perform its tasks has been increasingly undermined by its declining credibility and
4Other studies focus on international bodies like the European parliament (e.g., Attina 1990; Brzinski
1995; Hix et al. 2006), the assembly of the International Labor Organization (e.g., Boockmann 2006,
2003) or the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) (e.g., O’Neill 1996; Dreher et al. 2009).
5Editorial “The Shame of the UN” The New York Times, February 26, 2006. http://www.nytimes.com/
2006/02/26/opinion/26sun2.html.
6UN Special Report 2005. In Larger Freedom Addendum http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/add1.htm.
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professionalism.”7 The report also emphasizes the possible reputational damage of
the Commission to the UN as a whole since “the credibility of the Human Rights
Commission has eroded to the point that it has become a blot on the reputation of
the larger institution.”8 This report would later guide the reforms of the Commission.
Others, such as the US ambassador to the Commission at the time, called the election
of countries with a poor human rights record just “absurd.”9 Secretary General Kofi
Annan even stated that, “[s]tates have sought membership of the Commission not
to strengthen human rights but to protect themselves against criticism or to criticize
others.”10
Edwards et al. (2008, 394) find in their study that members could have had several
reasons for joining the Commission, namely to “influence the agenda to blame other
states..., in an act of self-defense, enabling them to insulate themselves from investi-
gation... and to deflect attention from themselves.” In addition, developing countries
tried to shift the focus from civil and political toward economic rights. As history
has shown, this is not uncommon within the UN framework as the interpretation and
focus on human rights can be very diverse. Edwards et al. (2008) even find that coun-
tries with a poor human rights record had higher chances of getting elected to the
Commission than those with high human rights standards.11
All this criticism was not in vein and following the publication of the UN Special
Report the General Assembly decided12 to abolish the Commission and replace it
by the UNHRC in March 2006. The newly created Council reports directly to the
General Assembly and therefore has a higher status than the Commission. It defines
itself as “an intergovernmental body within the UN system made up of 47 States
responsible for strengthening the promotion and protection of human rights around
the globe.”13 These 47 Member States are elected for a three year term by the UNGA
in accordance with the members’ “contribution to the promotion and protection of
human rights and their voluntary pledges and commitments made thereto” and “shall
uphold the highest standards in the promotion and protection of human rights.”14
According to Cox (2010, 89ff), however, especially when considering the much more
7UN Special Report 2005. In Larger Freedom http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/270/
78/PDF/N0527078.pdf?OpenElement, p. 45.
8UN Special Report 2005. In Larger Freedom Addendum, 5 http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/add1.htm.
9
“Sudan’s U.N. post provokes anger” Seattle Times, May 5, 2004 http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/
html/nationworld/2001920167 sudan05.html. See also the position of Human Rights Watch on this
issue in the Press Release Democracy Coalition Project 2004. http://www.democracycaucus.net/pdf/
undc press release may04.pdf.
10UN Special Report 2005. In Larger Freedom Addendum http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/add1.htm,
p. 45.
11See also Brett D. Schaefer “Elections for U.N. Human Rights Council Underscore the Need for Reform”
Backgrounder. No. 2417 June 2, 2010. Published by the Heritage Foundation.
12Resolution UN/A/RES/60/251 http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/A.RES.60.251 En.
pdf.
13http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil.
14United Nations 2006. A/Res/60/251 http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/A.RES.60.
251 En.pdf.
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far-reaching reform proposal by the United States, the changes introduced regarding
the membership are rather negligible. While members of the UNCHR were elected
by the ECOSOC committee of the UNGA, the regional groups still play a central
role in the election process.15 Nevertheless, Cox (2010, 108) notes that the share of
countries that are considered as not free by Freedom House slightly dropped among
the members in the first sessions of the UNHRC compared to the last sessions of the
UNCHR.16 More substantial changes concerned the Council’s working mechanisms,
which include the following:17
1. The Universal Periodic Review, “which serves to assess the human rights
situations in all United Nations Member States.”
2. An Advisory Committee “which serves as the Council’s ‘think tank’ providing
it with expertise and advice on thematic human rights issues and the Complaint
Procedure which allows individuals and organizations to bring human rights
violations to the attention of the Council.”
3. “The Human Rights Council also works with the UN Special Procedures estab-
lished by the former Commission on Human Rights and now assumed by the
Council.”
3 Voting in international organizations and human rights
While voting in the UNHRC has to our knowledge not been studied systematically
(see for some discussion and partial exceptions Besant & Malo 2009; Cox 2010;
Seligman 2011; McMahon 2012), some scholars have looked under various perspec-
tives at voting in its predecessor, i.e., the Human Rights Commission (e.g., Smith
2006; Lebovic and Voeten 2006 see below). Much more detailed studies on voting
in international bodies focused on the UNGA. Early studies relied heavily on the
notion of “blocs,” which were assumed to emerge in the voting record. Studying pos-
sible bloc building appeared to be important as it can suggest the direction which
15In order to have systematic rotation within the Council, certain countries were elected only for one or
two year terms in 2006. This has had the effect that by April 2010 64 UN member states had been elected
to the Council. Countries are elected depending on geographical distribution, the so-called UN regional
groups. These groups are the following (numbers of members in the Council in parentheses): Group of
African States (13); Group of Asian States (13); Group of Eastern European States (6); Group of Latin
American and Caribbean States (8); Group of Western European and other States (7).
16Strictly speaking, these selection mechanisms are likely to influence the working of the UNHRC, and
thus also its voting process. We refrain from addressing this issue in this paper directly for three reasons.
First, as we focus in our analysis on how characteristics of UNHRC members influence their voting records
in controversial resolutions, and the latter can be introduced even by nonmembers, we believe that taking
into account the membership selection would not affect our analyses. Second, our analyses do not pretend
to offer more general insights about decisions on human rights in international bodies. We only wish to
show what influences the voting decisions of members of the UNHRC. Third, as our analyses indirectly
allow for whether the politicization in the UNHRC is lower than in the UNCHR, the fact that membership
rules have only slightly changed allows us to keep these constant. This even more so as the election of
members proposed by regional groups is almost systematically endorsed by the UNGA.
17http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/AboutCouncil.aspx.
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an assembly may take and suggest ideas about voluntary or involuntary cooperation
and coordination among countries on specific topics. The notion of blocs proved,
however, difficult to define. Hovet (1960) offers a comprehensive discussion of this
notion, while Lijphart (1963) criticizes the various attempts to rely on geographical
groups as defined in the Charter itself, geographical proximity, closeness in other
respects etc. in earlier work (e.g., Ball 1951; Furey 1954; Riggs 1958; Ogley 1961;
Nicholas 1962).
While differing, these various early definitions have nonetheless some blocs in
common, like the Soviet Union with its satellite states (also called the Soviet-bloc),
the African bloc (sometimes mixed with the Arabs), the Arabs, the Latin American
bloc (Lijphart 1963), and later also the Western countries. Newer studies covering
longer time periods (e.g., Holloway 1990), argue that the developing countries or
also the “Muslims”18 appeared as new blocs, but also the “imperialists” or the “neu-
trals” (Newcombe et al. 1970), depending on the factors analyzed. Holloway (1990)
shows, however, that depending on the time period studied the blocs are not located
constantly in the same place spatially speaking. Certain countries moved around in
this space, so the “shapes” of the blocs have also been changing. Apart from studies
focusing on how the different blocs are taking form, others explore the internal life of
the blocs themselves. For example some authors study whether there are blocs within
the blocs (for the African “bloc inside the bloc” see Meyers 1966).19
With the end of the Cold War, the long established Warsaw Pact group
(Soviet-bloc), often considered as the most cohesive bloc, disappeared at least in
theory. In the 1990s the European Union (EU) appeared as an important new bloc
(analyzed by, among others, Young and Rees 2005; Smith 2006; Luif and Radeva
2007).
The way in which these blocs are identified, however, is largely inductive. More
specifically, authors most often employ some sort of a scaling approach to represent
countries in a low-dimensional policy space based on their voting records. Clusters of
countries are then identified on the basis of notions of blocs favored by the authors.
Proceeding this way, however, allows not to distinguish two possible ways in which
such clusters might emerge.20 On the one hand it might be that a group of countries,
for instance the member-states of the European Union (see below) wish to coordinate
their stance on human rights issues. This should lead to a more cohesive and distinct
voting pattern of these member states. On the other hand these same member states
might vote more often together simply because they have similar preferences when it
comes to resolutions on human rights. In what follows, drawing on an empirical strat-
egy employed in parliamentary research, we propose a way to separate out these two
elements, while also considering the role the proposers of controversial resolutions
play in explaining voting patterns.
18One could maybe argue that in the 1950s and 1960s when referred to the Arabs, the Muslims were also
included.
19See also the study by Marin-Bosch (1987).
20We consider this problem to be akin to the issue in research on parliaments whether members of the same
party vote together because they have the same political preferences or because belonging to a particular
party influences their voting record (see most notably Krehbiel 1993).
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3.1 Voting in the UNHRC: Expectations
In the most comprehensive study of the UNGA, Voeten (2000, 191) argues that vot-
ing heavily clusters member states and thus classifies various groups of countries
assumed to appear in UNGA voting. Similarly, two recent studies focusing more
closely on human rights issues in the UN implicitly or explicitly rely on the idea of
“blocs.” Smith (2006) assesses directly how one specific group of countries, namely
the member states of the European Union (EU), behaves in votes in the third com-
mittee of the UNGA (dedicated to human rights issues) and the UNCHR. As Smith
(2006) argues the EU puts considerable emphasis on appearing united in human
rights issues on the international scene (see also Wouters et al. 2008). Despite this
emphasis, she finds considerable dissent in the votes she analyzes. Lebovic and
Voeten (2006) offer a more comprehensive study of voting in the UNCHR, finding
that reputation effects appear to have played an increasing role over the lifetime of
this commission. These authors subsequently show that condemnation of particular
countries by the UNCHR affect multilateral (though not bilateral) aid flows (Lebovic
and Voeten 2009).
Boockmann and Dreher (2011) study voting on human rights issues in the UNGA
and argue that the average level of human rights violations in a country’s “peer group”
dominates the individual human rights record of a country in affecting the latter’s
voting decisions. While this seems an interesting empirical result, given that the “peer
groups” are defined by the World Bank classification it is hard to make sense out of
this finding in terms of a causal mechanism.
The two only systematic studies focusing on voting in the UNHRC that we are
aware of focus on specific aspects. Cox (2010, 111ff) suggests that resolutions tar-
geting particular countries (most notably Israel) are as prevalent in the new body as
they were in its predecessor. This assessment is confirmed by Seligman (2011) who
also proposes to evaluate three broad hypotheses by comparing the voting behavior
of groups identified by their degree of political freedoms as measured by Freedom
House in resolutions voted upon in the first sessions of the UNHRC. He finds very
distinct voting patterns especially for resolutions targeting Israel.21
These studies suggest, as does the broader literature on voting in international
assemblies, that at least two elements should influence voting in a body like the
UNHRC. On the one hand, studies like those by Voeten (2000), Smith (2006),
Wouters et al. (2008) and Boockmann and Dreher (2011) suggest that belonging to
particular groups of countries or blocs (defined in whatever way) should influence the
way in which UNHRC member states vote. On the other hand, authors like Lebovic
and Voeten (2009) and Seligman (2011) suggest that factors more related to the pref-
erences of states should affect the voting behavior. Consequently, we propose two
very broad hypotheses that rely on the arguments discussed above:
H1: Belonging to a group of countries taking clear positions on human rights
affects the voting behavior of its member-states (in a more human rights
respecting way, respectively in the opposite direction).
21Relatedly McMahon (2012) offers a systematic analysis of the “universal periodic review.”
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H2: A country’s preferences in the area of human rights records affect its voting
behavior.
To empirically evaluate these two hypotheses we need on the one hand to iden-
tify the groups of countries taking stances on human rights issues, and on the other
identify variables that should be related to the countries’ preferences in the area of
human rights. Regarding the first issue, we argue that the EU and the Organization of
the Islamic Conference (OIC, founded in 1969)22 are the blocs that take most often
the clearest stances. Regarding the EU, the studies by Smith (2006) and Wouters
et al. (2008) amongst many others underline the importance the EU attributes to
human rights, especially as they are discussed in international bodies. Thus, Macaj
and Koops (2012, e.g., 72) discuss in detail how the EU’s Common Foreign and Secu-
rity Policy has led to an important coordination effort in the area of human rights.
Regarding the OIC, Besant and Malo (2009, 145) note the importance of this group
(see also Luka´cs 2010, 2011),23 while Steinberg (2012, 374) goes as far as stating
that OIC plays a dominating role in the UNHRC (for a similar point, see Smith 2010,
225). As Macaj and Koops (2012, 81) argue, this is related to the growing impor-
tance of the notion of “defamation of religion.” In this debate the OIC plays clearly
a dominant role. Thus, if any blocs should constrain the voting behavior of UNHRC
member states the EU and the OIC should certainly be among them.
In order to separate out the effect of preferences from the one exerted by bloc-
membership we also need to identify variables likely to be related to the underlying
preferences of states in the area of human rights. Based on the literature, we argue
that three variables can serve as proxies for these preferences. First, as several studies
have argued, the respect for human rights can be assumed to be akin to revealed
preferences by states. Consequently we will rely on Cingranelli and Richards’ (2010)
data and for robustness tests on the “Political Terror Scale” (Wood and Gibney 2010).
Second, as numerous studies have shown (e.g., Park 1987; Henderson 1991; Poe
& Tate 1994; Hathaway 2002; Neumayer 2005; Vreeland 2008) democracies have
on average a better respect of human rights. Consequently, we assume that being a
democracy will also relate to preferences important in votes on human rights issues.24
Finally, we also consider that ratifying treaties in the area of human rights should be
related to preferences in this area. Several scholars have demonstrated that signing
and ratifying treaties and conventions in this area is related to respect for human
rights but not necessarily in a straightforward way (see Hathaway 2007; Vreeland
2008; Simmons 2009; Hollyer & Rosendorff 2011).
While the primary focus of this paper is to assess what affects the voting pat-
terns (and/or revealed ideal-points), we also wish to take into account how the
22The OIC serves as “collective voice of the Muslim world and ensuring to safeguard and protect the
interests of the Muslim world in the spirit of promoting international peace and harmony among various
people of the world” (Source: http://www.oic-oci.org/page detail.asp?p id=52).
23Simmons (2009, 83f) finds that Muslim countries do not strongly differ from those of other cultures
when it comes to ratifying human rights treaties, except those relating to women’s rights.
24See for a related, more theoretically grounded argument Hillman and Potrafke (2011).
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authorship of a proposal affects these patterns. We do this for two reasons. First of all,
several studies have highlighted that agenda-setting is closely related to voting behav-
ior (see for instance Carrubba et al. 2008). Second, and relatedly, not all decisions
in the UNHRC are reached in votes. A series of resolutions and other decisions are
adopted without a vote. Consequently, the observed votes and the members’ voting
behavior in the UNHRC can be considered as roll call votes, as at least one member
wishes to make the voting result public. As Hug (2010) shows, such votes often dif-
fer regarding several characteristics from secret votes. Carrubba et al. (2008) derive
from a theoretical model, however, the insight that the content of the proposal plays
in this context a central role.
Consequently, in our analyses we also control for the authorship of the proposal to
account at least in part for the possible selection biases identified by Hug (2010).25
As will become apparent below, the authorship of controversial proposals is heavily
concentrated among a small set of countries. We expect that resolutions proposed by
countries with rather extreme views in the area of human rights will polarize more
strongly the UNHRC member states. Hence we will also evaluate whether countries
frequently submitting controversial resolutions lead to a polarization of voting in the
UNHCR:
H3: Resolutions submitted by countries with less respect for human rights polarize
the voting behavior in the UNHCR.
As we show below, four sets of countries have submitted the largest share of
controversial votes, namely Cuba, Egypt, Pakistan and member states of the EU. Con-
sequently, we will test this third hypothesis by assessing how polarizing resolutions
proposed by these four groups compare to all the other resolutions.
4 Data and model
In this section we briefly describe the data we employ before discussing in more
detail the empirical model used to test our hypotheses.
4.1 Data
The data employed for this study consists of the recorded votes of the UNHRC’s
first thirteen ordinary sessions as of April 2010.26 Overall the UNHRC reached 271
25We do not go beyond this partial fix of the problem, as to our knowledge, there does not exist a selection
model that deals with the empirical approach we need to adopt here (see below).
26We refrain from comparing explicitly voting in the UNHRC with voting in its predecessor (the UNCRH),
as despite some similarities (see above) they still differ in terms of membership and procedure (for an
attempt in such a comparison, see Hug (2013)). For all documents concerning the voting see the UNHRC
website.
92 S. Hug, R. Luka´cs
decisions on resolutions during the first thirteen sessions.27 The large part of res-
olutions were, however, adopted without votes. As for the analyses we will carry
out below we will rely on votes and, in an even more constraining fashion on non-
unanimous votes, it is important to understand what characterizes the resolutions that
led to a vote. Table 1 reports for those 198 resolutions that were drafted and submit-
ted by a single actor whether or not a vote occurred, its authorship and in how many
sessions the proposer was member of the UNHRC.28
Table 1 first shows that only four countries drafted and submitted ten resolu-
tions or more, namely Cuba, Egypt, France and Pakistan. Three of these countries
had, according to Cingranelli and Richards’ (2010) data, a rather blemished human
rights record in 2008.29 Second, as about one fourth of all resolutions are adopted
in votes and mostly with controversy, it is striking that the resolutions introduced by
three of these countries (the exception is France) are more frequently submitted to a
vote than the average. This is also the case for some other countries, but given the
small numbers involved, these might be outliers. Obviously, the number of sessions
in which Cuba (13), Egypt (13), France (11) and Pakistan (13) were members might
also explain the high numbers of resolutions introduced by these countries.30 Several
other countries were, however, member of the UNHRC for equal number of sessions
and did not introduce as many resolutions, and certainly not as many controversial
ones.
Looking more closely at Table 1 one notes that following the three top-ranked
countries (Pakistan with 23 resolutions, Cuba with 20 and Egypt with seven) thir-
teen different countries proposed the remaining ones. Among these, seven stem from
EU-member countries.31 As we will analyze how EU member countries vote in con-
troversial votes, it is useful to assess how the EU fares in these 70 votes as a function
of who proposed the resolution. As Table 2 nicely shows, whenever Cuba and to a
lesser degree Pakistan or Egypt propose a resolution, the chances that the EU-member
countries will be on the winning side are small or even minute.32
Thus, it is obvious that simply focusing on the decisions reached in votes in
the UNHRC may introduce a bias, as they do not reflect the full business of the
UNHRC (see for a more detailed analysis along these lines on the UNGA Hug
2012). Information on the individual voting records is, however, only available for
27UNHRC 2010. http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/.
28The remaining 73 resolutions were submitted by several countries or in the name of a group, and thus
we omit these from Table 1. Glancing at these resolutions suggests that including them would not alter the
picture presented in Table 1.
29See the “Political Terror Scale” (Wood and Gibney 2010) for a similar assessment.
30We refrain from calculating averages per membership session as resolutions can also be introduced by
non members and the president.
31The EU countries are the following (with the number of resolutions in parentheses); Finland (1), Ger-
many (2), Poland (1) Russia (1) Slovenia (1) Portugal (1), and Spain (1). The remaining countries are the
following (with the number of resolutions in parenthesis); Algeria (4), Burkina Faso (1), Canada (1), Japan
(1), Nicaragua (1) and South Africa (2).
32We determined the EU’s position as being the modal response among “yea” and “nay” votes. Only if all
EU member countries did abstain did we consider the vote as characterized by EU’s abstention.
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Table 1 Drafters of resolutions adopted with and without votes
Adopted without vote Voted upon Total Membership
Country n % n % n % n sessions
Algeria 2 50.0 % 2 50.0 % 4 100.0 % 5
Argentina 3 100.0 % 0 0.0 % 3 100.0 % 10
Armenia 2 100.0 % 0 0.0 % 2 100.0 % 0
Austria 5 100.0 % 0 0.0 % 5 100.0 % 0
Azerbaijan 2 100.0 % 0 0.0 % 2 100.0 % 11
Bolivia 2 100.0 % 0 0.0 % 2 100.0 % 8
Brazil 7 100.0 % 0 0.0 % 7 100.0 % 13
Burundi 1 100.0 % 0 0.0 % 1 100.0 % 0
Canada 5 83.3 % 1 16.7 % 6 100.0 % 11
Chile 1 100.0 % 0 0.0 % 1 100.0 % 5
China 0 0.0 % 2 100.0 % 2 100.0 % 13
Colombia 1 100.0 % 0 0.0 % 1 100.0 % 0
Costa Rica 2 100.0 % 0 0.0 % 2 100.0 % 0
Coˆte d’Ivoire 2 100.0 % 0 0.0 % 2 100.0 % 0
Cuba 16 45.7 % 19 54.3 % 35 100.0 % 13
Czech Republic 1 50.0 % 1 50.0 % 2 100.0 % 5
Denmark 2 66.7 % 1 33.3 % 3 100.0 % 0
Egypt 11 57.9 % 8 42.1 % 19 100.0 % 8
France 13 100.0 % 0 0.0 % 13 100.0 % 13
Germany 1 100.0 % 0 0.0 % 1 100.0 % 11
Guatemala 1 100.0 % 0 0.0 % 1 100.0 % 0
Hungary 2 100.0 % 0 0.0 % 2 100.0 % 2
Indonesia 1 100.0 % 0 0.0 % 1 100.0 % 13
Italy 1 100.0 % 0 0.0 % 1 100.0 % 8
Japan 4 100.0 % 0 0.0 % 4 100.0 % 13
Maldives 2 100.0 % 0 0.0 % 2 100.0 % 0
Mexico 9 100.0 % 0 0.0 % 9 100.0 % 13
Morocco 1 100.0 % 0 0.0 % 1 100.0 % 0
Nigeria 6 85.7 % 1 14.3 % 7 100.0 % 13
Norway 3 100.0 % 0 0.0 % 3 100.0 % 2
Pakistan 2 18.2 % 9 81.8 % 11 100.0 % 13
Palestine 3 42.9 % 4 57.1 % 7 100.0 % 0
Poland 0 0.0 % 1 100.0 % 1 100.0 % 5
Portugal 8 88.9 % 1 11.1 % 9 100.0 % 0
President 3 100.0 % 0 0.0 % 3 100.0 % –
Russian Federation 2 100.0 % 0 0.0 % 2 100.0 % 13
Slovakia 1 100.0 % 0 0.0 % 1 100.0 % 5
Slovenia 3 100.0 % 0 0.0 % 3 100.0 % 8
South Africa 3 60.0 % 2 40.0 % 5 100.0 % 13
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Table 1 (continued)
Spain 3 100.0 % 0 0.0 % 3 100.0 % 0
Sweden 1 100.0 % 0 0.0 % 1 100.0 % 0
Switzerland 1 100.0 % 0 0.0 % 1 100.0 % 0
Thailand 1 100.0 % 0 0.0 % 1 100.0 % 11
Ukraine 1 100.0 % 0 0.0 % 1 100.0 % 13
United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland 3 100.0 % 0 0.0 % 3 100.0 % 13
Uruguay 2 100.0 % 0 0.0 % 2 100.0 % 13
Total 146 3.7 % 52 26.3 % 198 100.0 %
these votes on resolutions33 plus some votes on amendments and motions (eight
overall). This potential bias should be indirectly addressed when evaluating hypothe-
sis 3, namely when considering how the authorship of the proposal voted upon affects
the polarization of UNHRC members.
For our explanatory variables we rely on standard sources. To measure the respect
for human rights we rely on Cingranelli and Richards’ (2010) torture scale in 2008
as a general measure. As measure for democracy we rely on Cheibub et al. (2010)
dichotomous coding for 2008.34 Finally, to have an assessment of the ratification
behavior of UNHRC member states of human rights conventions we rely on Hath-
away’s (2007) data. The latter author provides for 2003 (and the years before) the
ratification status of the major human rights convention.35 We used the number of
these conventions ratified in 2003 (to allow for a sufficient lag) as measure as it takes
some time for treaty ratifications to affect behavior.
In addition to these variables allowing us to evaluate our three hypotheses we also
consider two control variables which might influence voting in the UNHRC.36 On
the one hand we control for GDP per capita measured in 1995 PPP by relying on the
Penn World Tables V7.0 (Heston et al. 2011). On the other we also use as control
variable the Net Development Assistance and Aid (in constant USD) from the World
Development Indicators (http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog).
33We exclude from our analysis six resolutions adopted with no opposing votes. The six resolutions are
the following ones: “Elimination of intolerance and discrimination based on religion or belief,” “Role of
good governance in the promotion and protection of Human Rights,” “Mandate of special rapporteur on
the promotion and protection of the rights of freedom and expression,” “Torture and cruel treatment: the
role of medical personnel,” “Situation of human rights in the Democratic Republic of Congo,” and “Right
to development.” See the online appendix on this journal’s webpage for the full list of votes.
34For South Korea the 2008 coding is missing in this data. We coded this country as democracy. In a
robustness check we also relied on the Polity indicator (Marshall et al. 2002).
35She covers the following treaties: 1987 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment (CAT), 1976 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 1981
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), Optional
Protocol to the ICCPR, and Articles 21 and 22 to the CAT.
36Anonymous reviewers suggested these control variables, and we gratefully acknowledge these useful
suggestions.
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Table 2 Proposer’s identity and the EU’s success
Proposer
Outcome for EU Pakistan Cuba Egypt EU country remaining Total
Loses 78.3 % (18) 90.0 % (18) 57.1 % (4) 28.6 % (2) 46.2 % (6) 67.6 % (48)
Wins 8.7 % (2) 10.0 % (2) 28.6 % (2) 71.4 % (5) 15.4 % (2) 19.7 % (13)
Abstains 13.0 % (3) 0.0 % (0) 14.3 % (1) 0.0 % (0) 38.5 % (5) 12.7 % (9)
Total 100.0 % (23) 100.0 % (20) 100.0 % (7) 100.0 % (7) 100.0 % (13) 100.0 % (70)
4.2 Model
Analyses of voting decisions in assemblies carried out to understand what under-
lying conflict lines can be detected have made considerable advances, also when it
comes to studies on international bodies. Early work, for instance by Alker (1964)
(see also Alker & Russett 1965) largely employed factor analytic models to deter-
mine the underlying conflict lines. As scholars mostly dealing with the US congress
noted, such factor analytic models lack, however, a solid theoretical underpinning to
allow for generating information on the relevant conflict lines. Based on this critique
Poole and Rosenthal (1985) developed a theoretically informed estimator based on a
spatial model of decision making.37 This estimation procedure, called NOMINATE,
was used among others by Voeten (2000) in his study on voting in the UNGA. More
recently scholars proposed estimating the underlying conflict lines by relying on the
so-called item-response theory (IRT) model stemming from the school testing liter-
ature (e.g., Fox 2010). Clinton et al. (2004) propose this approach to estimate the
ideal-points of legislators (see also Jackman 2004; Gelman & Hill 2006).38 All these
models rely on parametric models with quite constraining assumptions underlying the
estimator. Poole (2000) thus proposes a nonparametric technique to estimate ideal-
points of legislators.39 In some recent critical articles Spirling and McLean (2006,
2007) alert the reader that under certain circumstances these estimators may fail to
yield meaningful estimates, namely if the assumed spatial model of voting is not
appropriate, for instance if government and opposition vote against each other and
the latter are dispersed on opposite sides on the ideological scale.
All these methods have been applied to voting in international bodies in order
to deduce the preferences of member states based on their spatial location (for
instance after a factor analysis). If states belonging to particular blocs appeared to
be located close to each other “bloc voting” was induced. This inductive approach is
37See, however, Heckman and Snyder’s (1997) proposal how a simple linear probability model might be
underlying a factor analytic estimation procedure (though see Poole 2005).
38Carroll et al. (2009) offer an empirical evaluation of these different estimators.
39These various techniques are discussed in detail in Poole (2005).
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unsatisfactory as “blocs” are inferred from similar voting patterns, even though they
might also simply be due to similar preferences. In the approach we propose pref-
erences are estimated based on voting patters but also linked to explanatory factors
of these preferences. In addition, we also estimate how bloc-membership constrains
the voting patterns of their members beyond the variables that we hypothesize affect
preferences.
These external sources of information can easily be taken into account when
estimating models, especially those based on the item-response theory as estimated
in a Bayesian framework. For instance, Høyland and Hansen (2010) employ addi-
tional information on preferences to assess whether in the Council of Ministers
of the European Union a push toward more consensus exists. Similarly, Malecki
(2008) proposes, based on work by Fox and Glas (2001) (see also Fox 2007, 2010,
141–192), a hierarchical item-response theory model, where the ideal-points are
“explained” in part by exogenous variables.40 Gabel et al. (2008) use this approach
to assess what elements affect voting behavior on the European parliament (EP),
while Høyland (2010), drawing on a suggestion by Clinton et al. (2004), studies how
party group pressure is exerted in legislative matters in the EP, compared to votes on
non-legislative matters.41
In our study of the UNHRC we also rely on the classic “two-parameter” item-
response theory (IRT) model. In this model the probability (πij ) of a yes-vote (yij )
by actor i on issue j is following Jackman (2009, 455)
πij = Pr(yij |θi, βj , αj )
= F(θiβj − αj ) (1)
where θi is in our context the revealed ideal-point, βj the item discrimination of issue
j and αj the item difficulty of issue j . F being a cumulative density function either
of a normal or logistic type. For identification purposes, θi is usually assumed to be
normally distributed with μθ = 0 and σ 2θ = 1.
Fox and Glas (2001) (see also Fox 2007, 2010, 141–192) present the basic
ideas how an IRT model may accommodate a hierarchical data structure. Based
on this Malecki (2008) models θ as being dependent on some person specific
characteristics. When addressing the issue what member countries of the UNHRC
vote together we adopt such a hierarchical IRT model allowing the θs to vary
systematically with characteristics of the member states (xi). More precisely we
assume that
θi = xiβθ + θ (2)
40See for a similar approach to address a different problem Lauderdale’s (2010) hierarchical item-response
theory model.
41Proceeding in a more traditional way by estimating in a panel framework a model trying to explain
individual voting decisions would not allow us to take into account both preferences and bloc membership
in addition to information on who proposed the resolution voted upon.
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In a second step we assume that the item discrimination parameter βj varies with
characteristics of the resolution voted upon, more specifically its authorship (xj ).42
For this we assume that
βj = xjββ + β (3)
IRT models are most frequently estimated in a Bayesian framework, given the
numerous parameters to estimate and the distributional assumptions required for
identification. We proceed similarly in this framework and implemented these models
in JAGS (Plummer 2010).43
5 Empirical results
As only 76 votes occurred in the first thirteen sessions of the United Nations Human
Rights Council, we rely on a rather small empirical basis. In addition, as noted above,
we drop six unanimous votes from our analysis, as they are uninformative for the
estimates we wish to provide.44 This leaves us with 70 votes and 64 members who
voted in part in these votes. Each of the 64 member states voted on at least 9 of these
topics. We use this empirical base to evaluate our hypotheses, as discussed above,
with a hierarchical IRT-model. This model estimates at the same time the revealed
“ideal-points” (or preferences) for the member states, but also how the latter are influ-
enced by various independent variables (among them bloc-membership and variables
related to preferences). While voting in the UNHRC is ternary, namely comprising
yes- and no-votes as well as abstentions, we focus our analysis only on the first
two alternatives. Proceeding like this is justified, as the rules of procedure (http://ap.
ohchr.org/documents/E/HRC/resolutions/A HRC RES 5 1.doc) clearly specify that
with very few exceptions, abstentions are not relevant for the voting outcome, as
decisions are reached by simple majority by the member states present and voting.
Consequently, abstentions are likely to follow a different pattern and can hardly be
conceived as some intermediary category (though see Voeten 2004; Boockmann &
Dreher 2011).
As discussed above, our hypotheses relate to the effect of membership in two
groups, on the one hand, and democracy, human rights records and ratification of
human rights treaties on the other. Table 3 reports the second-level estimates of two
IRT models in which we first only estimate the parameters in Eqs. 1 and 2 and then
42Estimating these effects together with effects of blocs and preferences on voting requires an IRT-model
as used here. Using a more traditional type of regression model would require us to manually recode all
votes to ensure that our independent variables have the same directional effect in all votes. Our IRT-model
directly estimates the relevant “direction,” allows for estimating all the relevant parameters in one single
model and in addition imputes the missing data for the dependent variable (i.e., the votes).
43In an earlier version of this paper we also relied for the simpler models on Malecki’s (2008)
implementation of hierarchical IRT-models in MCMCpack (Martin and Quinn 2004).
44See the online appendix on this journal’s webpage for the full list of votes considered.
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Table 3 Hierarchical IRT model: second-level estimates
Credible interval Credible interval
Variable b 2.5 % 97.5 % b 2.5 % 97.5 %
Democracy 0.397 −0.355 1.150 −0.322 −1.060 0.439
Torture
Often −0.852 −1.650 −0.052 0.894 0.064 1.705
Frequently −1.630 −2.529 −0.795 1.675 0.753 2.540
EU 0.906 0.057 1.766 −0.836 −1.658 −0.036
OIC −1.586 −2.441 −0.723 1.600 0.825 2.535
Ratification 0.011 −0.162 0.203 0.007 −0.169 0.188
GDP 0.017 −0.008 0.040 −0.015 −0.038 0.008
Aid 0.012 −0.196 0.208 −0.016 −0.221 0.199
Proposer: EU −11.402 −18.370 −5.505
Pakistan 2.571 −1.658 8.455
Cuba 18.095 6.068 32.848
Egypt 5.893 −2.653 15.314
μβ −7.186 −11.783 −4.293 4.952 0.872 9.378
μα −3.759 −6.129 −2.146 −4.696 −7.762 −2.414
σβ 0.024 0.007 0.054 0.032 0.010 0.076
σα 0.131 0.045 0.306 0.066 0.024 0.150
Deviance 210.768 175.899 249.600 192.820 162.071 226.274
n votes 70 70
n legislators 64 64
also integrate Eq. 3 in the second model.45 The estimates (with their respective credi-
ble intervals) suggest that all our hypotheses point in the right direction. Considering
hypothesis 1 related to the effect of belonging to a particular bloc, we find that the
EU and the OIC pull their member countries in opposite directions from the remain-
ing UNHRC member-states. The credible intervals for both of these effects fail to
comprise the value of zero. Consequently, we have quite considerable evidence that
belonging to one of these two blocs actually influences systematically the voting
behavior of UNHRC members.
Regarding our second hypothesis both models reported upon in Table 3 offer con-
siderable support that preferences as measured by our three variables influence the
voting in the UNHRC. Countries engaging often or frequently in torture vote system-
atically differently from those not engaging in torture. Democracies and countries
45In the online appendix we depict some convergence diagnostics for all parameters estimated in the
model. Most parameter distributions seem to have converged (except the θs of some member states that
have voted only infrequently) after the 50000 burn-in iterations. Hence the reported estimates characterize
5000 iterations thinned by 5.
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having ratified more human rights treaties appear to vote in the opposite direction,
but the credible intervals for these two variables include the value of zero. Regarding
our two control variables we also fail to find any systematic effect. Receiving devel-
opment aid and/or being a rich or poor country fails to affect the preferences that find
expression in UNHRC voting. Thus it seems that the preferences emerging in this
assembly are related mostly to human rights practices, lending support to our second
hypothesis.
Our first model reported upon in Table 3, however, is clearly too simple, especially
given our results showing that the proposers of resolutions affect the results from the
EU’s perspective. To assess this and evaluate our third hypothesis we estimate a sec-
ond hierarchical IRT-model, this time with the parameter for the item discrimination
(β) varying as a function of the proposer’s identity, thus estimating the parameters in
Eqs. 1, 2, and 3. For simplicity’s sake we categorize the proposers into four groups,
namely the ones used in Table 2. As base category we employ the residual category
of “remaining” proposers. Consequently the estimated parameters reported for the
second model in Table 3 indicate whether resolutions proposed for instance by EU
member countries, discriminate more or less strongly among council members than
resolutions by the remaining countries.46 Similarly the sign indicates whether the
yes and no votes are on the same sides as in votes on resolutions proposed by the
remaining countries or not.
The results reported for model 2 in Table 3 underline again the crucial role played
by Cuba in controversial votes. Resolutions proposed by this country discriminate
most strongly among council members and compared with those proposed by other
countries and the credible intervals for this effect excludes the value of 0. The direc-
tion of the effect is similar for resolutions proposed by Egypt and Pakistan, though
the credible intervals for these coefficients are large and comprise 0. The coefficient
for the EU is positive, suggesting that resolutions introduced by EU member states
are on average less discriminating than those of the remaining UNHRC members.
The credible interval for this coefficient is large, however, and comprises 0, implying
that we cannot distinguish this effect from a null-effect.
When considering the estimated coefficients for blocs and our preference variables
we find largely the same results as above. Figure 1 illustrates the effects estimated
for our second model graphically with their respective credible intervals based on the
second model in Table 3.47 The figure clearly provides support for our first hypothe-
sis. The EU member states vote quite distinctly from their fellow UNHRC members,
as do the members of the OIC though in another direction. Consequently, our results
46In the online appendix we depict some convergence diagnostics for all parameters estimated in the
model. Convergence for this model is more problematic even after 50000 burn-in iterations. Nevertheless
we report estimates that characterize the 5000 iterations thinned by 5.
47We refrain from depicting the results graphically as some of the credible intervals are very large and
would distort a figure. In the online appendix we depict again some convergence diagnostics for all
parameters estimated in the model. Most parameter distributions seem to have converged but some, espe-
cially those based on few data points, hardly converged after the 1000000 burn-in iterations. The reported
estimates characterize 5000 iterations thinned by 5 after the burn-in iterations.
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Fig. 1 Hierarchical IRT Model: mean estimates of second-level coefficients for preferences and credible
intervals
lend support to studies on the EU, like Young and Rees (2005), Smith (2006) and
Wouters et al. (2008), who document an important coordination effort among the
member states. The same also appears for the OIC, for which Besant and Malo (2009,
145) also highlight the considerable coordination work. The effects are even stronger
for our main preference variable, namely whether countries engage in torture or not.
To have more confidence in our results we reestimated our two models by replac-
ing our two central variables linked to preferences by other measures.48 Instead
of using Cingranelli and Richards’ (2010) torture scale we relied on the “Political
Terror Scale” (Wood and Gibney 2010). We also replaced Cheibub et al.’s (2010)
dichotomous measure of democracy with the 21 point scale provided by the Polity
48This was suggested by reviewers, and we gratefully acknowledge this useful suggestion.
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Table 4 Hierarchical IRT model: second-level estimates, robustness check
Credible interval Credible interval
Variable b 2.5 % 97.5 % b 2.5 % 97.5 %
Democracy: polity2 −0.068 −0.149 0.006 −0.070 −0.156 0.008
Political terror scale 2 0.695 −0.109 1.456 0.797 0.002 1.633
3 1.361 0.611 2.155 1.505 0.689 2.320
4,5 2.394 1.388 3.433 2.512 1.536 3.641
EU −0.790 −1.676 0.057 −0.721 −1.633 0.190
OIC 1.384 0.459 2.373 1.420 0.441 2.462
Ratification 0.002 −0.193 0.199 0.038 −0.166 0.232
GDP −0.009 −0.034 0.018 −0.004 −0.030 0.023
Aid −0.071 −0.287 0.161 −0.051 −0.272 0.200
Proposer: EU −7.046 −11.910 −0.969
Pakistan 2.406 −0.629 6.114
Cuba 12.385 4.916 22.615
Egypt 4.497 −0.544 10.0159
μβ 6.827 3.831 11.921 3.010 0.382 6.063
μα −3.759 −5.879 −2.251 −3.540 −5.647 −1.978
σβ 0.028 0.008 0.067 0.077 0.025 0.198
σα 0.134 0.043 0.292 0.110 0.040 0.236
Deviance 210.262 175.642 248.835 209.543 176.674 248.778
n votes 70 70
n legislators 64 64
indicator (Marshall et al. 2002).49 The results depicted in Table 4 clearly demon-
strate the robustness of our results regarding preferences (i.e., hypothesis 2). We
still find a considerable effect for our main variable related to preferences, namely
the “Political Terror Scale.” These effects are particularly clear when we control
for the authorship of the resolution voted upon (model 2). Similarly, in this second
model we also find that the credible interval for our democracy measure excludes the
value of 0, suggesting that there is a systematic effect of this variable on the voting
behavior of UNHRC members. The effect of this variable, however, is rather small
(see also Fig. 2).
While thus the robustness check strengthens our confidence in hypothesis 2, the
results depicted in Table 4 suggest that hypothesis 1 is on much less solid ground.
49For these two variables we have two cases with missing data. For the “Political Terror Scale” based on
US State Department reports the value for the US is missing. As the score based on Amnesty International
reports equals 2, we used this value. Similarly, according to the Polity website the Polity2 value for Bosnia
Herzegovina is equal to 5, so we used this value.
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Fig. 2 Hierarchical IRT Model: mean estimates of second-level coefficients for preferences and credible
intervals (robustness test)
While in model 1 we still find a considerable effect for OIC bloc-membership, the
credible interval for the EU fails to exclude the value of 0. In model 2 this is even
the case for both blocs, suggesting that bloc-membership does not systematically
affect voting behavior in the UNHRC. Regarding the control variables we still fail
to find a systematic effect, both in models 1 and 2. Our results regarding the influ-
ence of Cuba as a proposer of resolutions survives this robustness check as well
(model 2).
We depict the effects related to hypotheses 1 and 2 again graphically in Fig. 2.
This figure shows that support for hypothesis 2, namely that variables related to
preferences affect voting in the UNHRC, is quite robust and solid. On the other
hand, it appears that the effect of bloc-membership is not as robust, as it depends
on whether or not we control for the authorship of resolutions, and on what pref-
erence variables we employ. Support for hypothesis 1, taking into account Fig. 2,
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is thus weaker. Quite to the contrary, the two sets of analyses lend considerable
support to hypothesis 3 related to the effect of authorship of resolutions those res-
olutions authored by Cuba appear to discriminate more strongly among UNHRC
members.
6 Conclusion
Our systematic analysis of controversial votes in the UNHRC suggests that voting
behavior is largely affected by what we might consider the preferences of member
states. Despite controlling for the major human rights relevant “peer groups” we find
that their effects pale compared to those of variables related to preferences. Conse-
quently, both the human rights record of a country and to a lesser extent its level
of democracy prove important factors in explaining the preferences related to vot-
ing in the UNHRC. Countries with poor human rights records vote systematically
differently from those that do not engage in torture.
On the other hand we find only mixed evidence that blocs are relevant in this
new UN institution. Whether we find evidence in support of bloc-voting depends
on the measures we use for our preference variables and whether we control for the
authorship of the resolution voted upon. Here we find that resolutions proposed by
Cuba strongly polarize the member states of the UNHRC in their voting.
While our analyses are still based on a rather limited empirical basis, we can draw
two broad conclusions. First of all, from a methodological perspective our analysis
demonstrates that work on international assemblies should employ approaches that
allow to distinguish between the effects of blocs and preferences when looking at
voting behavior. When doing so, accounting for the authorship of the proposals also
proves important. Second, from a substantive point of view our analyses suggest that
the criticisms leveled against the UNHRC’s predecessor have not lost all their rele-
vance. When assessing the effect of a resolution’s sponsor we find that especially one
set of resolutions can be distinguished. Those proposed by Cuba heavily discriminate
among members of the UNHRC and thus find strong reflection in the voting pat-
terns. They differ from proposals submitted by other countries, especially compared
to those authored by EU member countries. The latter countries also systematically
lose in the controversial votes initiated by Cuba, and to a lesser extent by Egypt and
Pakistan.
Hence our results suggest that not all defects of the UNCHR have been mended
with the UNHRC.50 Controversy in this assembly is largely introduced by countries
with blemished human rights records. As a consequence, many of the conclusions
presented on the UNHRC’s predecessor still seem to apply. Hence, despite a heavy
dose of “lipstick” the animal has not lost all its “caterpillar”-features.
50Hug (2013) can show that in the last ten sessions of the UNCHR Cuba was the second most frequent
proposer of resolutions, following the United States (the latter country not being a member of the UNHRC
at its beginning).
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